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Abstract—This paper studies linear quadratic games with set
up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely,
players whose action is non-zero. Such games arise naturally in
joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a prelim-
inary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies
and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is
the study of the same game under large population. Numerical
illustrations are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study linear quadratic games with set
up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely,
players whose action is non-zero. Such games arise naturally
in multi-retailer inventory application as shown in a previous
work of the same authors [1].
In the first part of this paper, we analyze some properties of
the best response strategies. In particular, we show that best
response strategies are non-idle in the sense that a player never
switches from being inactive to active for fixed behaviors of
the other players (fixed set up costs). Non-idleness is used to
derive an iterative procedure to compute Nash equilibria.
We then turn to consider large population games and in
doing this we link our study to mean field games [2] [3] [4].
It turns out that most properties enjoyed by the game with
finite players still hold when the number of players tends to
infinity. This preliminary consideration allows us to claim that
fixed points exist and that these are associated to mean field
equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we in-
troduce the game. In Section III we analyze some properties
of best response strategies. In Section IV, we discuss Nash
equilibria. In Section V, we consider the game with large
population and illustrate the mean field approach. In Sec-
tion VI, we provide numerical illustrations and conclude in
Section VII.
Notation. We denote by P = {1, 2, . . . , n} a set of n players.
We use index i to refer to the generic ith player. Likewise,
index −i refers to all players other than i. We use R+ to
denote the set of non-negative reals. Open and closed intervals
between scalars a and b are denoted by [a, b] and (a, b)
respectively. We use [0, T ] to denote a finite horizon from 0 to
T . Given a function of time φ(·) : [0, T ) → R, we denote by
φ(t) its value at time t ∈ [0, T ). We use φ[ξ](·) to express the
dependence of the function on a given parameter or function ξ.
II. GAME DEFINITION
Each player i ∈ P is characterized by the state variable
xi(·) ∈ R, the initial state x0i ∈ R, the measurable control
t 7→ ui(t), taking value, for all t ∈ [0, T ), in the set R. The
state variable evolves according to the dynamics
{
x˙i(t) = ui(t), t ∈ [0, T )
xi(0) = x
0
i
. (1)
Let us also introduce the measurable opponents’ control t 7→
u−i(t), taking value, for all t ∈ [0, T ), in the set Rn−1 and
denote the sets for the measurable controls u and u−i by
Ui =
{
ui : [0, T )→ R
∣∣∣ui measurable} ,
U−i =
{
u−i : [0, T )→ Rn−1
∣∣∣u−i measurable} . (2)
Let K, α, and β be given positive constants; δ : R→ {0, 1}
be defined as in (3) and a : Rn−1 → R+ as in (4) where b is
a constant greater than 0:
δ(ui(t)) =
{
0 if ui(t) = 0,
1 otherwise;
(3)
a(u−i(t)) = b+
1
n
∑
j∈P
δ(uj(t)). (4)
The ith cost function is then
Ji(x
0
i , ui, u−i) =
∫ T
0
(
Kδ(ui(t))
a(u
−i(t))
+ xi(t)
2
+ αui(t)
2
)
dt+ βxi(T )
2
.
We say that a player is active at time t if its control ui(t)
is non-null. Then, the above cost function implies that each
player i ∈ P pays for its state norm xi(t)2. In addition,
if active, it pays both a fixed cost
Kδ(ui(t))
a(u
−i(t))
and a variable
cost αui(t)
2 for implementing its strategy. Observe that the
fixed component of the cost is distributed among all the active
players.
III. PROPERTIES OF NON-DOMINATED STRATEGIES
Let the set of the non-anticipating strategies for the first
player be
M =
{
µi = µi[x
0
i , ·] : U−i → Ui
∣∣∣
ua−i(s) = u
b
−i(s)∀s ∈ [0, t] =⇒
µi[x
0
i , u
a
−i](s) = µi[x
0
i , u
b
−i](s)∀s ∈ [0, t],
∀ua−i, ub−i ∈ U−i, ∀t ∈ [0, T )
}
.
(5)
Hereafter, we consider only strategies µi[x
0
i , u−i] such that
1) µi[x
0
i , u−i](t) = 0 or sign(µi[x
0
i , u−i](t)) =
−sign(xi(t)) where xi(t) is solution of{
x˙i(t) = µi[x
0
i , u−i](t), t ∈ [0T )
xi(0) = x
0
i
, (6)
2) µi[x
0
i , u−i] is piece-wise continuous.
There is no loss of generality in such a choice as, given the
player i dynamics and cost, for no reason i would control its
state so to increase its state norm.
We say that a strategy µi[x
0
i , u−i] is non-idle if, for each
interval [t1, t2], 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T in which the set up cost
K
a(u
−i(t))
is non-decreasing, ui(t) := µi[x
0
i , u−i](t) > 0 for
all t1 ≤ t ≤ t1 +∆t and ui(t) = 0 for all t1 +∆t < t ≤ t2,
for some 0 ≤ ∆t ≤ t2−t1. Then, a player i that implements a
non-idle strategy, over the considered interval, is either always
active or is always inactive or is first active and then inactive,
but in no case it remains some time inactive before becoming
active. Hereafter, we define switching time instant, the time
in which a non-idle strategy u(t) becomes non-active, i.e., the
time inf{t : u(t) = 0}.
The following two lemmas prove that a non-dominated
strategy for a player i is non-idle and that the instantaneous
set up cost paid by an active player cannot decrease over time.
Lemma 1: A strategy that is not non-idle is dominated.
Proof: Given a time interval [t1, t2], 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤
T where K
a(u
−i(t))
does not decrease, consider two strate-
gies µai [x
0
i , u−i] and µ
b
i [x
0
i , u−i] (see Fig. 1) such that
µai [x
0
i , u−i](t) = µ
b
i [x
0
i , u−i](t) for all t 6= [t1, t2] and

µai [x
0
i , u−i](t) = 0, t ∈ [t1, t1 +∆t)
µai [x
0
i , u−i](t) 6= 0, t ∈ [t1 +∆t, t2)


µbi [x
0
i , u−i](t) = µ
a
i [x
0
i , u−i](t+∆t), t ∈ [t1, t2 −∆t)
µbi [x
0
i , u−i](t) = 0, t ∈ [t2 −∆t, t2)
.
Denoting uli the control where u
l
i(t) := µ
l
i[x
0
i , u−i](t) and
the label l ∈ {a, b}, we prove that control uai is dominated by
ubi .
To see this, let us denote by xi(t1) =
∫ t1
0
uai (t)dt +
x0i =
∫ t1
0
ubi (t)dt + x
0
i , and xi(t2) =
∫ t2
0
uai (t)dt + x
0
i =∫ t2
0
ubi (t)dt+ x
0
i . In the following, we prove that
Ji(x
0
i , u
a
i )− Ji(x0i , ubi )) > 0. (7)
Indeed, the costs induced by the two strategies are equal
for 0 ≤ t ≤ t1 and t2 ≤ t ≤ T , as in such interval the two
strategies assume the same values and induce the same states
for the player.
Then consider the interval t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, the cost paid by uai
is ∫ t1+∆t
t1
xi(t1)
2dt+
∫ t2
t1+∆t
K
a(u−i(t))
dt+
+
∫ t2
t1+∆t
αuai (t)
2dt+
∫ t2
t1+∆t
xi(t)
2dt.
Differently, the cost paid by ubi is∫ t2−∆t
t1
xi(t)
2dt+
∫ t2−∆t
t1
K
a(u−i(t))
dt+
+
∫ t2−∆t
t1
αuai (t+∆t)
2dt+
∫ t2
t2−∆t
xi(t2)
2dt.
Now, note that
∫ t2
t1+∆t
K
a(u
−i(t))
dt ≥ ∫ t2−∆t
t1
K
a(u
−i(t))
dt since
K
a(u
−i(t))
does not decrease for t1 ≤ t ≤ t2. In addition,
observe that
∫ t2
t1+∆t
uai (t)
2dt =
∫ t2−∆t
t1
uai (t + ∆t)
2dt, and∫ t2
t1+∆t
xi(t)
2dt =
∫ t2−∆t
t1
xi(t)
2dt, then the inequality (7)
holds true, as it becomes
Ji(x
0
i , u
a
i )− Ji(x0i , ubi )) ≥ (xi(t1)2 − xi(t2)2)∆t > 0.
Hence, the lemma is proved.
Fig. 1. Qualitative plot of the state evolution with strategies µa
i
[x0
i
, u−i]
(solid) and µb
i
[x0
i
, u−i] (dashed) for t ∈ [t1, t2] used in the proof of Lemma
1.
Lemma 2: If all the players play non-dominated strategies,
K
a(u
−i(t))
does not decrease for all i ∈ P and all 0 < t < T .
Proof: The value K
a(u
−i(t))
decreases for some player i
and some 0 < t < T , if there is at least another player j that
in tj switches from being inactive to being active.
Let us first prove the result under the assumption that no
more than one player can become active at each time instant.
Then, there exists a value t1 ≥ 0, a value ∆t > 0, and an
interval 0 ≤ t1 < t1 + ∆t = tj < t2 < T , such that
player j is first inactive and then active even if K
a(u
−j(t))
remains constant. Then, by Lemma 1, player j cannot be
playing a non-dominated strategy.
Given the above argument, for K
a(u
−i(t))
to decrease for
some player i, we must assume that a set S of players, with
|S| ≥ 2, coordinates to switch from being inactive to being
active at time tj > 0. Even in this case, there exists a value
t1 ≥ 0, a value∆t, and an interval 0 ≤ t1 < t1+∆t = tj < T ,
such that K
a(u
−s(t))
remains constant, for all s ∈ S. Following
the same line of reasoning of Lemma 1, it is immediate
to prove that strategies that coordinate the switch at time
t1 induce less costs for all the players in S and then they
dominate the current strategies (that coordinate the switch at
time tj). We can conclude that the strategy that coordinates
the switch at time tj cannot be a non-dominated one.
We define switching feedback strategy at τ any control ui[τ ]
that satisfies:
ui[τ ](t) := µi[x
0
i , u−i](t)
=
{
f(t, τ)xi(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
0 for τ < t ≤ T
.
(8)
In the hypotheses of the above two lemmas, the following
corollary holds.
Corollary 1: For all τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T and for
each player i there exists a unique non-dominated switching
feedback strategy ui[τ ] as in (8).
Proof: For all τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , the non-dominated
strategy is
ui[τ ](t) =
{
u˜i(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
0 for τ < t ≤ T
,
where t 7→ u˜i(t) solves the problem below:
u˜i := argmin{
∫ τ
0
(
K
a(u−i(t))
+ xi(t)
2 + αui(t)
2)dt
+((T − τ) + β)xi(τ)2}
= argmin{
∫ τ
0
(xi(t)
2 + αui(t)
2)dt
+((T − τ) + β)xi(τ)2}.
The equality holds as the value of K
a(u
−i(t))
is independent of
u˜i(t). In addition, if x
0
i > 0, the second problem, because of
the quadratic structure of the costs, presents a unique optimal
continuous solution of type u˜i(t) = f(t, τ)x(t). The latter
strategy is independent of the fixed cost and is different from
zero for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , as it can be directly verified explicitly
solving the optimization problem. In this context note that this
problem is a quadratic control problem that can be analytically
solved using the maximum principle or a differential Riccati
equation.
Hereafter, for any realization of u−i and therefore
K
a(u
−i(t))
,
we say that the best response strategy of player i is the
switching feedback control at t∗i defined as:
ui[t
∗
i ] := argminui[τ ]:0≤τ≤T {J(xi0,ui[τ ], u−i)}
=: µ∗i [x
0
i , u−i].
(9)
Note that a strategy solution of (9) always exists and is unique,
as it can be verified analytically that J(xi0,ui[τ ], u−i) is a
continuous strictly convex function of τ . In case of multiple
solutions, we observe that an immediate consequence of the
above lemma is that the corresponding state trajectories do not
intersect. Then, in the rest of the paper, we consider as best
response strategy only the one that defines the state trajectory
with minimal value for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The next lemma relates the switching times of two different
players.
Lemma 3: Given two players i and j, such that x0i ≥ x0j >
0, if uj [t
∗
j ] is a best response strategy for player j, then all
the strategies of player i ui[τ ] where τ < t
∗
j are dominated.
Proof: The statement of this lemma can be directly veri-
fied by explicitly determining the values of J(x0i ,ui[τ ], u−i)
and J(x0j ,uj [τ ], u−i) and observing that J(x
0
i ,ui[τ ], u−i)
decreases for τ ∈ [0, t∗j ] as long as J(x0j ,uj [τ ], u−j) decreases
in the same interval. The latter is true as uj [t
∗
j ] is the best
response strategy for player j.
The above lemma can be rephrased by saying that according
to their best responses if player j is active then player i is
active too.
The next theorem states under which condition a player
active a time t = 0 becomes inactive in a following time
instant. Specifically, it points out the dependence of the
switching time instant of a non-dominated strategy on the
value of the fixed cost.
Theorem 1: According to a non-dominated strategy, player
i is active as long as the instantaneous set up cost satisfies the
following condition
Kα
a(u−i(t))
≤ (((T − t) + β)xi(t))2. (10)
When the above condition is satisfied, a non-dominated strat-
egy is bounded as in (11), where γ := −((T − t) + β)xi(t)
and ∆ := (((T − t) + β)xi(t))2 −Kα/a(u−i(t)):
γ −√∆
α
≤ ui(t) ≤ γ +
√
∆
α
. (11)
Proof: We analyze under which circumstances player i,
active at time t, remains so for a further interval time ∆t > 0.
Then, let us look at interval [t, t+∆t] and consider a non-null
strategy, where u(t) > 0, and a null strategy, with u(t) = 0,
for t ∈ [t, t+∆t]. Let us compare the cost to go from t to T
induced by such strategies. The cost to go of the null strategy
is ∫ t+∆t
t
xi(t)
2dτ +
∫ T
t+∆t
xi(t)
2dτ + βxi(T )
2.
Similarly, the cost to go of the non-null strategy is the one
displayed below, with ∆xi =
∫ t+∆t
t
ui(τ)dτ :∫ t+∆t
t
(
K
a(u−i(τ))
+ αui(τ)
2 + xi(τ)
2
)
dτ
+
∫ T
t+∆t
(xi(t) + ∆xi)
2(t)dτ + β(xi(t) + ∆xi)
2.
Then, we compute the difference of the two costs for ∆t→ 0,
to obtain(
K
a(u−i(t))
+ αui(t)
2
)
dt+2(T − t)xi(t)dxi +2βxi(t)dxi.
Since dxi = ui(t)dt, after dividing by dt the latter can be
rewritten as
K
a(u−i(t))
+ αui(t)
2 + 2(T − t)xi(t)ui(t) + 2βxi(t)ui(t).
Hence, the non-null strategy provides a lower cost than the
null strategy, and therefore we would rather have ui(t) > 0
in t, if and only if the above difference is non-positive, that
is if αu2i (t) + 2((T − t) + β)xi(t)ui(t) + Ka(u
−i(t))
≤ 0. In
turn, this last inequality holds if and only if conditions (10)
and (11) are satisfied.
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that a
player is certainly never active if Kα > (b+ 1− 1/n)((T +
β)x0i )
2.
Lemma 3 also implies that if all the players j 6= i play their
best responses, and using u−i[t
∗
−i] to denote their set of best
response strategies in compact form, then it holds
Kα
a(u−i[t∗−i](t
∗
i ))
= (((T − t∗i ) + β)xi(t∗i ))2. (12)
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we show how to determine a set of Nash
equilibria strategies for players in P under the assumption
that 0 < x01 ≤ x02 ≤ . . . ≤ x0n. To this end, we heavily exploit
Lemma 3 to determine the best response of the players.
Preliminarily, for each player i let us define Kˆi :=
K
b+n−i+1
n
and tˆi the time instant, if exists, for which by applying a
switching strategy ui[tˆi] the following equality holds
Kˆiα = (((T − tˆi) + β)xi(tˆi))2. (13)
If no tˆi satisfies the above condition and furthermore if
Kˆiα > ((T + β)x
0
i )
2, then we set tˆi = 0, otherwise if
Kˆiα < ((T + β)x
0
i )
2 then we set tˆi = T . Note that ui[tˆi]
is the best response strategy for player i if K
a(u
−i(tˆi))
= Kˆi,
that is, if at the switching time instant the only active players
are the ones with state greater than or equal to xi(tˆi), or, that is
the same, as the trajectories of best strategies cannot intersect,
the only active players are the ones with initial state greater
than or equal to x0i . In other words, tˆi is the last time instant
in which it is convenient for player i to remain active even if
there are only other n− i active players.
Lemma 3 implies that if all the players play their best
responses, then strategy u1[t
∗
1] for player 1 must satisfy:
K
a(u−1[t∗−1](t))
=
{
K
b+1 =: Kˆ1 if 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗1
0 if t∗1 < t ≤ T
.
From the latter condition, and invoking conditions (12)-(13),
we can infer that t∗1 = tˆ1 and also that player 1 has a unique
non-dominated strategy u1[t
∗
1] = u1[tˆ1].
Let us now consider the generic player i > 1. It holds
t∗i = max{t∗i−1, tˆi}. (14)
Indeed, Lemma 3 implies that player i must be active at least
as long as player i−1 is active, hence t∗i ≥ t∗i−1. Lemma 3 also
implies that if t∗i > t
∗
i−1, then in t
∗
i the only active players
are the ones with state greater than or equal to xi(t
∗
i ), this
in turn implies that t∗i is either equal to t
∗
i−1 or equal to tˆi,
that is that player i can consider only two strategies ui[t
∗
i−1] or
ui[tˆi]. Finally, observe that player i chooses ui[tˆi], if tˆi > t
∗
i−1
because it is convenient for player i to remain active even if
only other n− i players are active after t∗i−1.
The above argument points out how it is easy to practically
determine Nash equilibrium strategies ui[t
∗
i ] of the game under
study. Indeed, the strategy of player 1 can be individuated
without knowing the strategies of the other players, then,
recursively, the strategy of player i can be derived only on
the basis of the strategies of the previous i− 1 players.
V. LARGE NUMBER OF PLAYERS
Let us now reformulate our game from a mean field per-
spective. To this end, let m(x, t) be the distribution of the
players’ states at time t. Hereafter, we always assume that the
support of m(x, t) is a subset of R+. Let us also define the
function a˜(·) : Rn−1+ 7→ R as a˜(x−i) := b +
∫ +∞
xi(t)
dm(x, t).
Then, we can rewrite Kˆi as
Kˆi =
K
a˜(x−i)
. (15)
The considerations over the state trajectories that precede
Lemma 3 imply that
∫ +∞
xi(t)
dm(x, t) =
∫ +∞
x0
i
dm(x, 0) is
invariant over time and, indeed, the arguments in Section IV
allow to determine Nash equilibrium strategies only on the
basis of the initial state distribution.
We are interested in determining the generic player best
strategy in presence of a large number of players. Also, in
the same context, we are interested in determining the evo-
lution over time of the players’ state cumulative distribution
Q(y, t) :=
∫∞
y
dm(x, t).
A. Generic player i best strategy
Let us first consider the generic player i best strategy.
The recursive equation (14) allows player i to determine the
switching time instant t∗i of its best strategy ui[t
∗
i ] and hence
to individuate the strategy itself. Unfortunately, equation (14)
is of no practical use in presence of a large number of players
as it would force player i to wait for the decision of all the
players from 1 to i−1 before being able to compute t∗i . For this
reason, player i may decide to play an approximatively optimal
strategy ui[t˜
∗
i ] based on an estimate t˜
∗
i of t
∗
i . In particular, we
observe that we may rewrite equation (14) as
t∗1 = max{tˆi,max
j<i
{tˆj}}.
Then, for any subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1}, the value
t˜∗i = max{tˆi,max
j∈S
{tˆj}} ≤ t∗i
is an estimate, and in particular a lower bound, of the switching
time instant t∗i . Needless to say that the t˜
∗
i becomes a better
and better estimate of t∗i , and hence ui[t˜
∗
i ] a better and better
approximation of the best strategy ui[t
∗
i ], as the subset S
includes more and more elements of {1, 2, . . . , i− 1}.
The above kind of approximate strategy requires that player
i communicates with the players in S to acquire the values
of tˆj . Player i can play a different approximate strategy that
just needs the observation of the behavior of player i − 1 as
described in the following.
Player i remains active as long as i − 1 is active. Then,
at the switching time instant ti−1 of i − 1, player i decides
whether it is convenient to remain active or not and for how
long. If all the players use such an approximate strategy, this
approximation identifies the best strategy from the switching
time instant of i−1 on. Indeed, from such time instant player i
can determine its best strategy based on the number of active
players: all the players from 1 to i − 1 are not active any
more, viceversa, all the players from i+ 1 to n remain active
at least as long as i is active. Unfortunately, player i cannot
play its best strategy until the switching time instant of i− 1
as it cannot a priori know its value. As the optimal choice
would be a strategy of type u˜i(t) = f(t)x(t), player i can
approximate such a strategy, as an example fixing the value
of f(t) to a constant.
B. Evolution of the cumulative distribution
We now study how Q(y, t) =
∫∞
y
dm(x, t) evolves over
time. Specifically, as the trajectories of players with different
initial states do not cross, it must satisfy the transport equation
∂
∂t
Q(y, t) = −u(y, t) ∂
∂y
Q(y, t), (16)
where u(y, t) is the control applied at time t by a player with
state x(t) = y.
As the best strategy of a player depends only on its initial
state, we observe that, for each initial state x0 and time instant
t we can write x(t) − x0 =
∫ t
0
u˜(τ)dτ , where u˜ is the best
strategy of a player with initial state x0. Then the solution
of (16) is
Q(y, t) = Q(y −
∫ t
0
u˜(τ)dτ, 0),
as it can be directly verified computing the partial derivatives
of Q(y, t) and exploiting the fact that u˜(t) = u(x(t), t).
The above results generalize to all the cases in which players
choose strategies that depend only on the initial states. We also
observe that the more the time to go T − t gets closer to 0
the higher must be the state of a player for being convenient
for the player to be active. Formally, there exists an increasing
function λ : [0, T ]→ R such that
u(y, t) =
{
0 for y ≤ λ(t)
f(t)y for y > λ(t)
.
Hence, we can rewrite Q(y, t) as
Q(y, t) =


Q(y − ∫ t
0
u˜(τ)dτ, 0) for 0 ≤ t ≤ λ−1(y)
Q(y, λ−1(y)) for λ−1(y) < t ≤ T .
n T α β K xi(0) τ
200 20 20 1 1600 [0, 150] 1, 1.5, . . . , T
TABLE I
SIMULATIONS DATA.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we provide numerical illustrations for a large
number of players evolving according to system (1) and with
simulations data as reported in Table I.
In particular, the number of players is n = 200 and the
horizon is T = 20.
The parameters appearing in the cost (5) are set as follows:
α = 20, β = 1, and K = 1600. Initial states xi(0) for
all i are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 150]. We
also discretize the set of possible switching times and so
τ ∈ {1, 1.5, . . . , T}.
The Algorithm used to numerically illustrate the players’
behavior accepts the simulations data as input and returns the
best response strategies ui[t
∗
i ] as in (9) and the associated state
distribution dm(x, t).
The algorithm is designed as follows. First, we initialize the
state by using the Matlab in-built functions rand to generate
a realization of the random variable x(0) and sort to reorder
the agents for increasing states.
For every possible value of the switching time τ ∈
{1, 1.5, . . . , T}, and for all players i = 1, . . . , n, we compute
the optimal (we say optimal as for fixed τ the strategy ui[τ ]
is independent of the other players’ behaviors) strategy ui[τ ]
as in (8).
To do this, we solve the following differential Riccati
equation in the scalar variable p(t) t ∈ [0, τ ]:
p˙(t) =
1
2α
p(t)2 − 2, p(τ) = 2(T − τ) + β.
The solution of the above ordinary differential equation with
boundary value on final time is obtained using the Matlab
in-built function ode45 with step size 0.1. Function f(t, τ)
appearing in (8) is then derived by setting f(t, τ) = − 12αp(t).
As a result we have ui[τ ](t) = − 12αp(t)xi(t) for all t ∈ [0, τ ].
We also compute the cost associated to each ui[τ ] as
illustrated in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2 one observes that the costs
are convex and increasing on the initial state value xi(0)
(higher curves correspond to higher xi(0)). Also the minimum
is increasing on the initial state value xi(0) and this is in
accordance with the fact that the players’ trajectories preserve
their order through time as recalled repeatedly throughout the
paper.
For every player i = 1, . . . , n, we then extract by brute force
comparison, the strategy ui[t
∗
i ] as in (9). Hence, we simulate
the state evolution with ui[t
∗
i ] and illustrate the results in
Fig. 3. One can observe that for most of the players, especially
those with a higher initial state, the switching time t∗i is around
15. Players usually stop before reaching zero as expected in
consequence of the presence of a fixed cost K in the cost
Algorithm
Input: Simulations data
Output: best response strategies ui[t
∗
i
] (9) and associated
state distribution dm(x, t).
1 : Initialize state x(0)← rand[0, 150],
2 : for τ = 1, 1.5, . . . , T do
3 : for player i = 1, . . . , n do
4 : compute ui[τ ] (8) and associated cost,
5 : end for
6 : end for
7 : for player i = 1, . . . , n do
8 : extract ui[t
∗
i
] as in (9);
simulate state evolution with ui[t
∗
i
];
compute distribution dm(x, t).
9 : end for
function. A player with a state relatively close to zero at a
time t ≈ T (t is approaching the end of the horizon T ) will
be inactive to avoid paying the fixed cost.
Finally, we compute the distribution dm(x, t) at three
different times, t = 0, T/5, T , and display the results in
Fig. 4. One observes that at t = 0 (top) the players are
uniformly random distributed over the interval [0, 150]. For
t = 4 (approximately one fifth of the horizon, i.e., t = T/5)
players are all distributed over the interval [0, 60] (middle).
For t = 20 (end of the horizon) all players have reached an
equilibrium state close to but different from zero as evidenced
by the peaks of dm(x, T ) (bottom).
Fig. 2. Cost of switching feedback strategies at τ , ui[τ ] as in (8), for
different values of τ = 1, . . . , T .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Inspired by joint replenishment inventory systems, we have
introduced linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic
on the number of active players, namely, players whose action
is non-zero. We have first analyzed the properties of the best
response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game.
The obtained results are extended to the same game under
large population.
Fig. 3. Time plot of state x(t) with best response strategies ui[t
∗
i
] as in (9).
Fig. 4. Distribution dm(x, t) for t = 0 (top), t = T/5 (middle), and t = T
(bottom) with best response strategies ui[t
∗
i
] as in (9).
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